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[Abstract] 6 
The academic and policy debate regarding the role of central banks and financial regulators in 7 
addressing climate-related financial risks has rapidly expanded in recent years. This Perspective 8 
presents the key controversies and discusses potential research and policy avenues for the future. 9 
Developing a comprehensive analytical framework to assess the potential impact of climate change and 10 
the low-carbon transition on financial stability appears to be the first crucial challenge. These enhanced 11 
risk measures could then be incorporated in setting financial regulations and implementing central 12 
banks’ policies.  13 
[Main text] 14 
Achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement will require a large-scale shift towards low-carbon 15 
technologies. However, socio-technological transitions often involve disruptive adjustments, even when 16 
they are ultimately beneficial to human welfare.1,2 This process of ‘creative destruction’ is likely to take 17 
place also during the low-carbon transition, with potentially significant repercussions on economic 18 
dynamics and financial stability.3,4 Societies thus face the challenging task of achieving a rapid 19 
structural shift to a low-carbon economy, while concurrently avoiding excessive economic losses and 20 
safeguarding the stability of the financial system (see Table 1). 21 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 22 
Central banks and financial regulators have started examining the implications of climate change and 23 
the low-carbon transition in recent years. In 2015, Mark Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England 24 
and Chairman of the Financial Stability Board, first discussed the ‘tragedy of the horizon’ embedded in 25 
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the different time spans that characterize monetary and financial stability policies (2-3 years and up to 26 
a decade, respectively) and the much longer-term perspective required to deal with climate-related 27 
risks.5 This was followed by related speeches by other central bankers and regulators.6–12 More recently, 28 
a group of eight central banks and financial regulators from both high-income and emerging economies 29 
have formed a ‘Network for Greening the Financial System’.13 Researchers in academia, international 30 
institutions, and civil society organizations are also investigating the dynamic links between central 31 
banks, financial systems and the low-carbon transition.14–20  32 
This Perspective critically discusses the main features of the debate, and identifies avenues for future 33 
research and policy implementation. First, we present the rationale for central banks and financial 34 
regulators to be interested in climate and the low-carbon transition. Second, we analyze their potential 35 
role in promoting a better understanding of climate-related financial risks. Third, we discuss the 36 
appropriate scope of their role in mitigating these risks. Options range from supporting voluntary risk 37 
disclosure by private companies and investors to mitigating climate-related risks, or even actively 38 
promoting low-carbon investments. Finally, we discuss how these activities would fit into their current 39 
mandates, and present open questions for further research. 40 
Central banks and climate change 41 
Central banks are public institutions with specific objectives determined by their national 42 
governments or legislators. They are typically responsible for monetary policy, which influences the 43 
supply and the demand of money and credit in the economy. Monetary policy is often aimed at 44 
achieving price stability, defined in terms of an explicit inflation rate target. In addition, several central 45 
banks also have a mandate to maintain the stability of the financial system and to regulate and 46 
supervise individual financial institutions. Additional objectives of central banks may include exchange 47 
rate stability, employment creation and economic growth.18  48 
Some central banks have started studying the implications of climate change and the low-carbon 49 
transition for the financial sector, primarily due to their responsibility for financial regulation and 50 
supervision. Recent research suggests that, in addition to large physical and economic losses, 51 
unmitigated climatic change could also affect the stability of the financial system.21–23 For instance, the 52 
increase in climate-induced physical risks (e.g. heat waves, floods and storm surges) could have a direct 53 
effect on the insurers that cover them. If these risks are uninsured, the deterioration of the affected 54 
households’ and corporates’ balance sheets could lead to losses for their lender banks.  55 
To avoid physical damages and the associated financial instability, a transition to a carbon-free 56 
economy is ultimately necessary. However, the transition itself might increase the risks of economic 57 
dislocation and ‘stranded’ assets (transition risks). For instance, meeting the 2°C temperature threshold 58 
will probably require a large portion of existing reserves of oil, gas and coal to remain in the ground24,25, 59 
and thus be written off from the balance sheets of the companies that own them. Other physical assets 60 
that could lose value include part of the electricity generation capacity, real estate, transportation 61 
infrastructure and carbon-intensive industrial technology.26–28 Such asset stranding could not only lead 62 
to economic losses and unemployment, but could also affect the market valuation of the companies that 63 
own these assets, thus negatively impacting their investors, and potentially triggering cascade effects 64 
throughout the interconnected financial system.4,29 65 
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While some disruption at the sectoral level is inevitable, the transition as a whole could represent an 66 
opportunity for sustainable and inclusive economic prosperity.30,31 However, this is likely to be possible 67 
only in the presence of a comprehensive and harmonized set of policies aimed at supporting the low-68 
carbon transition and managing its complex dynamics.  69 
The primary responsibility for strategic planning rests with governments, which have a variety of 70 
policy options at their disposal. For instance, they can introduce environmental regulations (e.g. 71 
standards on fuel efficiency); implement climate-friendly infrastructure investment programs (e.g. smart 72 
electrical grids); and design market-based policies to shift the preferences of households and companies 73 
towards low-carbon activities. The main proposed policy instrument has been carbon pricing, which 74 
could be implemented either through the introduction of a tax on the carbon content of goods and 75 
services, or the creation of a cap-and-trade system of emission allowances.32,33 Other market-based 76 
instruments, such as the introduction of subsidies for clean technologies and a phasing-out of fossil fuel 77 
subsidies, also follow a similar logic.  78 
Whether a well-designed set of fiscal and environmental policies by the government will prove 79 
sufficient to meet Paris climate objectives is subject to debate. Certain market failures existing in 80 
financial systems might not be properly addressed by pricing mechanisms, thus providing inadequate 81 
incentives to mobilize low-carbon investments at the scale and pace required.14 More importantly, 82 
government climate policies might not by themselves prevent financial instability during the transition; 83 
in fact, they might exacerbate transition risks, if implemented too abruptly and without the necessary 84 
precautions. Finally, the perception that carbon pricing could damage businesses and consumers often 85 
makes it a politically unpalatable choice for governments constrained by the electoral cycle, thus 86 
leading them not to act with the strength that would be required to ensure a smooth transition.  87 
The complexity of the transition has led researchers to start investigating what central banks and 88 
financial regulators could do to support a rapid and orderly transition. The rest of this Perspective will 89 
critically evaluate the debate over the appropriate scope of their interventions. Four broad types of 90 
interventions have been either adopted by, or suggested for, financial regulators and central banks in 91 
dealing with climate-related risks. First, they can develop methodologies and tools that would promote 92 
a better understanding of these risks and their economic and financial implications. Second, investors 93 
can be encouraged or required to disclose their exposure to climate-related risks. Third, these risks can 94 
be explicitly taken into account in setting financial regulations. Fourth, central banks can take into 95 
account climate-related risks in their policy toolkit (e.g. monetary policy). Table 2 gives an overview of 96 
these potential actions. 97 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 98 
Assessing climate-related financial risks  99 
Some central banks have started assessing the exposure of their domestic financial system to climate-100 
related risks. For instance, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) has recently conducted two studies of the 101 
Dutch financial system showing that,	while the exposure to fossil fuel producers is relatively small, the 102 
broader exposure to carbon-intensive sectors is large enough to pose potential systemic risks, and that 103 
4 
 
some of these risks are already materializing.26,34  Insurers and banks could also experience significant 104 
losses as a result of severe climate-related events. The Bank of England reviewed the exposures of the 105 
UK insurance sector to climate-related financial risks in 2015, and is conducting a similar review of the 106 
banking sector.35 Other institutions that have examined the potential impact of climate change or the 107 
low-carbon transition on financial stability include the European Systemic Risk Board, Sweden’s 108 
Finansinspektionen and Banque de France.29,36,37 Researchers have also started developing ‘climate 109 
stress-testing’ methods, highlighting how exposures among investors can exacerbate the impact of the 110 
low-carbon transition on the financial system.4,38  111 
However, the assessment of the climate-related financial risks faces various challenges. First, the data 112 
required to perform a comprehensive climate stress test are often absent or insufficiently granular, and 113 
hard to access for researchers outside financial regulatory bodies. Second, an integrated evaluation of 114 
climate-related financial risks cannot rely only on static snapshots: it requires the modelling of the 115 
dynamic interactions between the macroeconomy, the financial system, climate change and 116 
environmental policies.  117 
This is not a trivial task. Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), traditionally used to study 118 
economy-climate interactions, typically lack a representation of the financial system. Despite some 119 
exceptions, Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models, often used by central banks in 120 
macroeconomic and monetary policy analysis, normally abstract from climate change and 121 
environmental policies.39 Moreover, benchmark DSGE models featuring representative agents, rational 122 
expectations, and a rapid reversal to equilibrium in response to shocks are not appropriate for assessing 123 
the complex and dynamic implications of a large-scale structural change. Analyzing these effects will 124 
require a framework which features an accurate description of real and financial interactions between 125 
heterogeneous agents, and incorporates the role of fundamental uncertainty in their decision-making 126 
process. Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) and Agent-Based Models (ABM) might provide valuable 127 
alternatives.40–43 These models analyze the macroeconomy as a complex adaptive system, in which non-128 
linearities and disequilibrium phenomena play a key role. They can also incorporate network effects 129 
that stem from the interactions between agents, and are able to represent the process of endogenous 130 
money creation by commercial banks through bank loans.44 Some central banks have started developing 131 
such models, although without an environmental focus.45,46 However, these are relatively new 132 
methodological approaches and the techniques for estimating and calibrating them are still in 133 
development. Establishing a framework, or a plurality of frameworks, for assessing and quantifying the 134 
macro-financial impacts of climate change and the low-carbon transition thus remains an area that 135 
requires further research.  136 
The push for risk disclosure 137 
A key obstacle to the achievement of a smooth low-carbon transition is the low awareness of 138 
companies and investors about their exposure to climate-related financial risks. The majority of 139 
companies are not used to assessing how these risks impact their business models, while most investors 140 
are unaware of how exposed their portfolios are. The recent international effort has thus primarily 141 
focused on improving information flows by supporting the disclosure of climate-related risks by private 142 
actors. For example, the Financial Stability Board established a Task Force for Climate-related 143 
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Financial Disclosures. Its final report makes sector-specific recommendations on how companies could 144 
voluntarily disclose climate-related financial risks, in order to better inform their investors, lenders and 145 
insurance underwriters.47 The French Energy Transition law goes further and requires listed companies 146 
to disclose information on their exposures to climate-related risks and the measures adopted to reduce 147 
them, and requests banks to conduct climate-related stress testing on their portfolio of loans and 148 
disclose the results.48 Several industry- or academia-led initiatives aimed at improving climate-related 149 
information available to financial investors also exist.49 However, while central banks have been 150 
supportive of disclosure of climate-related risks by private firms, to date they have not disclosed the 151 
exposure of their own asset portfolios. 152 
The support for the development of voluntary disclosure standards is in line with the wider strategy 153 
of encouraging the financial industry to appropriately price climate-related risks, while respecting the 154 
freedom of enterprise and market dynamics. However, it is still uncertain what the effects of voluntary 155 
disclosure will be. Many large investors appear reluctant to request companies to assess and disclose 156 
how they would be affected by a 2°C-compliant scenario.50 Despite recent progress, climate-related risk 157 
disclosures by firms may not become sufficiently comprehensive, meaningful and comparable in the near 158 
term. Investors may also fail to pay attention to the disclosed information if they are not available in 159 
formats that are easy to understand and comparable across firms.   160 
Thus, further research is needed in refining methodologies for assessing and disclosing climate-related 161 
financial risks facing individual firms.47 Over time, this could lead to more standardized, comparable 162 
disclosure which allows investors to take these risks into account in allocating their capital.  Such 163 
research is also likely to contribute to better classification schemes for ‘green’ assets, and more 164 
informative labelling of such assets for investors.51 Concurrently, the development of spatially-detailed 165 
integrated databases of physical assets could improve risk assessment, even in the absence of 166 
disclosure.52  167 
However, existing research suggests that a combination of behavioral biases and misaligned 168 
professional incentives may lead financial markets to be excessively focused on short-term returns and 169 
thus not to fully price climate-related risks, even when information about these is available.53–55 170 
Therefore, risk disclosure and asset-level data might be made more effective by measures that promote 171 
the use of longer-term horizons in investment decisions.56 172 
Climate-aligned financial regulation 173 
It is in principle possible to go further and adapt financial regulations to take into account climate-174 
related risks. Macro- and micro-prudential policies (e.g. the Basel III regulatory framework designed in 175 
the aftermath of the financial crisis) encompass a range of regulatory instruments aimed at limiting 176 
systemic financial risk, or specific financial risks facing individual financial institutions. The tools at 177 
their disposal vary across jurisdictions, and could include reserve, liquidity, and capital requirements, 178 
caps on loan-to-value ratios and ceilings on credit growth, in some cases aimed at specific sectors.57,58 In 179 
some cases institutions holding riskier assets are required to satisfy more stringent regulatory 180 
requirements, e.g. to fund their assets with more equity than otherwise. Recent research suggests that 181 
this might have negatively affected the willingness of banks to lend to low-carbon projects, because of 182 
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their higher perceived risk, low liquidity and long tenor.59 However, current prudential regulation does 183 
not explicitly account for climate-related risks. Implementing a more comprehensive assessment of risk 184 
could instead lead to a higher capital requirement on carbon-intensive assets, in consideration of their 185 
higher transition risks.60,61 If this in turn leads to an increase in the cost of financing high-carbon 186 
activities, it could also have the effect of re-directing lending towards low-carbon activities. 187 
Some emerging market central banks have used prudential policies to mitigate environment-related 188 
risks or encourage lending to low-carbon activities.62 For example, Banque Du Liban differentiates 189 
reserve requirement ratios - i.e. the required ratio of central bank reserves held by private banks to 190 
their stock of deposits – according to the amount of bank lending flowing to renewable energy and 191 
energy efficiency projects.63 Banco Central do Brasil requires commercial banks to incorporate 192 
environmental risk factors into their governance framework and demonstrate how these risks are 193 
evaluated when calculating their capital needs.64 The People’s Bank of China is in the process of 194 
incorporating green financing into its ‘Macro-Prudential Assessment’ (MPA) framework.65 195 
The idea that financial regulations could take into account climate-related risks more explicitly 196 
appears to be gaining political traction also in high-income countries. The EU High-Level Expert Group 197 
on Sustainable Finance has recently suggested to explore the option of introducing ‘brown-penalizing’ 198 
or ‘green-supporting’ factors on capital requirements depending on the sustainability risks carried by 199 
the borrowing sectors.56,66 The European Commission has proposed that the European Supervisory 200 
Agencies integrate environmental, societal and governance (ESG) criteria into their work, in order to 201 
enable them to monitor how financial institutions identify, report and address the risks that such 202 
factors may pose to financial stability.67  203 
There are still several areas of concern over the effectiveness of such measures. First, there is the 204 
danger that reducing capital requirements on bank loans to low-carbon investments could jeopardize 205 
prudential policy objectives. More in general, the role of capital requirements is to mitigate risks; their 206 
design should thus remain risk-based. Second, climate-aligned prudential policy could be too blunt a 207 
tool if applied to banks’ exposures to entire productive sectors or companies, as it would not be able to 208 
discriminate within carbon-intensive sectors (e.g. utilities) those companies that engage in low-carbon 209 
investments. However, estimating banks’ capital requirements based on the ‘greenness’ of specific 210 
investment projects might overburden banks with assessment exercises they are not familiar with. 211 
Third, high-carbon companies could bypass the tightening of prudential policy in one jurisdiction by 212 
raising funds on the international financial markets, unless such policies are implemented across all 213 
major jurisdictions.  214 
Given the concerns above, financial regulators in high-income countries may not consider reflecting 215 
climate-related financial risks in the calibration of prudential policy tools unless there is compelling 216 
evidence that the exposure of the financial sector to these risks is sufficiently large. This calls for 217 
further innovative research in the field of climate stress-testing and macroeconomic modelling aimed at 218 
quantifying climate-related financial risks.  219 
A ‘green’ Quantitative Easing? 220 
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It has also been proposed that central banks might wish to consider aligning their monetary policy 221 
tools to environmental sustainability goals.68 Prior to the 2007-8 global financial crisis, major central 222 
banks operated monetary policy primarily through adjustments of the reference interest rate. In the 223 
aftermath of the crisis, many central banks have also initiated ‘unconventional’ Quantitative Easing 224 
(QE) measures in the form of large-scale purchase of financial assets, such as government and corporate 225 
bonds, in order to provide additional stimulus to the economy. 226 
Central banks’ QE programs are intended to be temporary cyclical tools.  As such, they have been 227 
designed to avoid ‘distorting’ the market, while concurrently ensuring that assets being purchased meet 228 
high credit standards. The European Central Bank (ECB), for instance, buys sovereign bonds 229 
respecting the current maturity distribution, and allocates purchases of corporate bonds across sectors 230 
according to the current bond market sectoral weights.69,70 However, recent research suggests that the 231 
‘market-neutral’ corporate bond purchases have inadvertently favored large carbon-intensive companies, 232 
reflecting their relatively strong credit ratings and the fact that many low-carbon firms are too small to 233 
issue corporate bonds.71 When central banks buy a type of asset in large quantities, market participants 234 
might assess this asset category more liquid and less risky than others. This raises a concern that 235 
central banks’ asset purchases, even if temporary, could have the unintended consequence of 236 
perpetuating the current ‘carbon lock-in’ of the economic system, thus undermining their own effort of 237 
encouraging financial markets to better account for climate-related risks.  238 
To mitigate this undesired effect, it has been suggested that central banks could recalibrate QE 239 
purchases so to exclude carbon-intensive financial assets and favor bonds issued to fund low-carbon 240 
projects.16,72,73 Alternatively, central banks could keep their current QE programs unchanged and run a 241 
parallel independent program focused on purchasing additional low-carbon financial assets. This ‘green’ 242 
QE would have the benefit of providing large amounts of additional liquidity to companies interested in 243 
shifting to clean forms of production. The overall purchases by the ECB during 2017, for instance, 244 
amounted to around €730 billion, while the total additional annual investment required to achieve EU 245 
energy and climate targets are estimated at €170 billion.55,63 Central banks could expand the proportion 246 
of purchases in ‘green’ bonds, which represent a niche but rapidly expanding market, estimated at €221 247 
billion globally in 2016.75 These bonds can be issued by companies, development banks, local authorities 248 
or, more recently, governments. 249 
Among the proposals discussed here, this is probably the one that has raised greatest controversy. 250 
This is primarily due to the fact that central banks view QE as a cyclical policy instrument aimed at 251 
providing temporary stimulus to the economy. Using it to engineer a low-carbon structural change 252 
might overburden central banks with additional responsibilities and potentially compromise their 253 
effectiveness in maintaining price stability. Moreover, low-carbon assets often do not meet the existing 254 
financial risk standards to be included into the list of eligible assets for central bank purchase, which 255 
mainly consist of investment grade bonds – i.e. bonds with low default risk. Purchasing riskier green 256 
assets could raise concerns regarding the quality of central banks’ portfolio, particularly when central 257 
banks do not have the capacity to evaluate the relative merits of new technologies in times of 258 
disruptive change. Finally, introducing strict low-carbon requirements for central bank asset purchase 259 
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might reduce the universe of purchasable assets. For these and other reasons, the idea of explicitly 260 
supporting the low-carbon transition via a ‘green QE’ has been repeatedly rejected by central bankers.9  261 
It should be noted, however, that an indirect form of green QE might already be happening through 262 
the purchase of bonds issued by public sector entities that finance low-carbon activities. For example, 263 
the ECB allocates around 10% of its Public Sector Purchase Programme to bonds issued by 264 
‘supranational institutions’, which include several regional and national development banks.74 265 
Development banks have been at the forefront of climate mitigation financing in recent years.76,77 For 266 
instance, the European Investment Bank (EIB) dedicates a minimum of 25% of its lending to climate 267 
action projects.78 Thus, the ECB might already be indirectly supporting low-carbon investments, 268 
although to a limited extent, through the inclusion of EIB-issued bonds in its QE program.     269 
Central bank mandates 270 
Ultimately, what central banks and financial regulators will do to support a smooth low-carbon 271 
transition will depend on what their mandate allows, how this is interpreted, and their willingness to 272 
act. The mandates and policy tools at the disposal of central banks significantly differ across countries. 273 
In particular, a distinction can be drawn between the central banks of high-income regions and the 274 
central banks of developing economies. 275 
Most central banks in high-income countries have relatively narrow mandates primarily focused on 276 
price stability and, in some cases, financial stability and regulation of individual financial institutions. 277 
They are typically granted operational independence in order to achieve specific objectives within their 278 
mandate. Thus, they normally avoid interfering either with market dynamics or government policies, 279 
unless it is necessary to achieve their objectives. Consequently, they have thus far mainly sought to 280 
enhance the resilience of the financial system to climate-related risks by developing and promoting the 281 
use of better information and portfolio assessment tools (e.g. climate stress tests). Other measures 282 
taken include international collaboration for nurturing green financial markets, including through the 283 
Green Finance Study Group of the G20, the Sustainable Insurance Forum, and the Network for 284 
Greening the Financial system (NGFS).13,79,80 285 
By contrast, central banks in emerging and developing countries have used a wider set of tools to 286 
target sectors linked to environmental sustainability, reflecting their mandates that are both broader 287 
and more strongly linked to governments’ development objectives. For instance, the Reserve Bank of 288 
India requires that commercial banks allocate a certain proportion of lending to a list of ‘priority 289 
sectors’, which now include renewable energy.81 The Bangladesh Bank has introduced a minimum credit 290 
quota that financial institutions have to allocate to green sectors, currently set at 5%, and offers 291 
refinancing lines to commercial banks at preferential terms for their green loans.82 While not in an 292 
emerging economy, the Bank of Japan’s Loan Support Program also offers loans at below market rate 293 
to financial institutions in order to support several ‘lending priority sectors’, including ‘environment 294 
businesses’.83  295 
A key question is whether central banking institutions in high-income countries are likely to modify 296 
their mandates in order to start using their policy tools to explicitly support the financing of low-297 
carbon activities. Changes in central bank mandates are far from unprecedented. The first central 298 
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banks were established to enhance the financial power of the sovereign during military conflicts.84 Over 299 
time, the responsibilities of central banks have transformed in response to economic events and 300 
changing monetary practices. For the majority of the 20th century central banks had a larger range of 301 
objectives than today, including high or full employment, exchange rate stability, management of 302 
government deficits and support to strategic industrial sectors (in particular in the post-World War II 303 
period85). With the consent of national governments, they have also often implemented policies 304 
supporting or repressing specific sectors of the economy, sometimes stretching beyond their usual 305 
boundaries of operation.86  306 
However, despite this historical experience, it seems unlikely that central bank mandates in high-307 
income countries will be modified to include wider societal goals, such as supporting a low-carbon 308 
transition. Moreover, the question of whether this would be appropriate requires further examination. 309 
On the one hand, there is an increasing recognition that climate change and the low-carbon transition 310 
might pose system-wide risks to the macroeconomic and financial system, which may justify more 311 
proactive interventions by a wider set of public institutions, including central banks and financial 312 
regulators. On the other hand, widening their mandate – for example to support credit to low-carbon 313 
investment projects – could risk overburdening central banks with excessive responsibilities, which 314 
could take up management capacity to the detriment of their primary objectives of maintaining 315 
monetary and financial stability. Moreover, as unelected institutions, it may be undesirable to confer 316 
central banks additional powers and responsibilities over a broad range of social and environmental 317 
issues for which credible accountability frameworks are difficult to design.  318 
Incorporating climate-related risks  319 
While a change in mandate seems unlikely, this may not be necessary in order for central banks in 320 
high-income countries to support the transition to a low-carbon economy. In case climate-related 321 
financial risks are found to be material to the stability of the financial system, this could ultimately 322 
justify the implementation of measures aimed at mitigating them across all central banking operations.  323 
Central banks could incorporate climate-related criteria in assessing whether an asset should be 324 
eligible for central banks’ asset purchase as part of their standard portfolio management. The DNB 325 
already applies ESG criteria and purchases green bonds for own-account investments.87  The Swiss 326 
National Bank has its own ethical criteria to exclude a certain set of companies from its foreign equity 327 
purchase.88 The Norges Bank has ESG criteria for the government’s pension fund that it manages, and 328 
explicitly excludes companies involved in coal-based energy production or responsible for severe 329 
environmental damage.89 Central banks could consider applying these criteria to cyclical policy 330 
measures, such as the current QE programs. The objective would not be to support financing of low-331 
carbon investments, but to prevent the purchase of assets that do not satisfy financial risk standards, 332 
where risk is assessed using more comprehensive methodologies that include climate-related criteria. 333 
The same principle could be applied to central banks’ collateral frameworks. The collateral 334 
framework defines assets that financial institutions can pledge in order to borrow from the central 335 
bank, as well as the amount that they can borrow against those assets. The criteria used by central 336 
banks to establish the eligibility of an asset as collateral and the ‘haircut’ imposed could have deep 337 
impact on the desirability - and thus price - of the asset.90 Being included in the collateral framework 338 
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gives an incentive to issue such financial instruments in larger quantities, which could in turn have an 339 
impact on the economy.91,92 Central banks could therefore consider incorporating climate-related risks 340 
explicitly in determining the list of eligible collateral and the size of the haircut. 341 
Conclusions and future avenues of research 342 
The primary responsibility for managing the transition to a low-carbon economy rests with the 343 
elected governments. However, if it is true that climate change is indeed ‘the greatest and widest-344 
ranging market failure ever seen’,93 the effort for a smooth low-carbon transition will require the 345 
implementation of a comprehensive set of policies, some of which might require the collaboration of 346 
central banks and financial regulators.  347 
This cooperation will not require a modification of central banks’ mandate. Supporting the 348 
development of more comprehensive measures of financial risk to include climate physical and 349 
transition risks is well within their present mandate of ensuring effective functioning of financial 350 
markets. These more comprehensive measures can then be applied to test and disclose the climate-351 
related exposure of both the financial system as a whole and individual financial institutions. If these 352 
risks are evaluated to be material to the stability of the financial system, central banks and financial 353 
regulators should consider reflecting them in their regulatory and asset eligibility assessment 354 
frameworks.  355 
Several open questions and research gaps remain. First, despite the recent growth of work on the 356 
topic,94 further progress is needed in developing robust methodologies and collecting comprehensive 357 
data for evaluating climate-related risks which companies and investors are exposed to. The push for 358 
risk disclosure, the development of asset-level databases and the refinement of climate stress-test 359 
techniques will all contribute in filling this gap. Progress in this direction will help firms to disclose 360 
climate-related risks in a comparable manner, and support central banks and financial regulators to 361 
better assess the exposure of both individual financial institutions and the financial system as a whole. 362 
Further research in these areas will also help central banks to evaluate climate-related risks in their 363 
own asset portfolios. It will also contribute to developing a definition of green or sustainable 364 
investment, which is both widely accepted and used by investors. Having a clear and widely accepted 365 
methodology and taxonomy could also help central banks in considering the case for disclosing climate-366 
related risks in their own asset porfolios.  367 
Second, there is the need to develop models that enable a forward-looking assessment of climate-368 
related risks and their social and macroeconomic repercussions. This is particularly relevant for the 369 
evaluation of the potential effects of the policies discussed in this article on growth, employment, 370 
distribution and financial stability. The analysis of these effects is challenging since policies are likely to 371 
involve time-dependent trade-offs and might have undesirable or unexpected implications (e.g. rebound 372 
effects). This will require combining dynamic macroeconomic modelling (possibly using a plurality of 373 
methodological approaches: IAMs, ABMs, DSGE and SFC models), financial data and modelling, 374 
climate scenarios, historical analysis and political economy considerations. Central banks can be 375 
instrumental in supporting such efforts and facilitating the exchange of best practices across modelling 376 
communities. 377 
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Making progress in the directions outlined above is urgently needed in order to sustain the 378 
momentum in ”greening” the financial system, which will require collaboration across the research 379 
community, financial market participants, financial regulators and central banks. Researchers can best 380 
contribute in this process by developing practically and immediately useful methodologies for 381 
evaluating climate-related risks and their wider economic impact, and refine these over time.       382 
 [End] 383 
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